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are basically optimists about the possibility of achieving civic virtue 
in contemporary society, while Strauss was a pessimist, at least in 
that he believed contemporary society could not escape degeneracy. 
Indeed, Strauss's distinction between philosophers and statesmen 
shows that he believed civic republicanism was one of those neces-
sary fictions that philosophers could see through-thus their eso-
teric philosophy-but could not expose to public view-thus their 
exoteric philosophy. 
Finally, I have suggested that Strauss gives a right-wing flip to 
certain positions that have also attracted the left. As summarized 
by Drury, Strauss's critique of modernity sounds a lot like what 
Horkheimer and Adorno had to say about "the dialectic of enlight-
enment." Indeed, the similarities in this instance extend below the 
surface, because Horkheimer and Adorno were at least as pessimis-
tic about the prospects for modern society as was Strauss, although 
on Drury's presentation it seems that Strauss accepts modern de-
generacy with a stoic resignation, whereas Horkheimer and Adorno 
were enraged by degeneracy even though they saw no way to recon-
stitute a good society. 
All this adds up to the suggestion that Strauss probably does 
have some interesting things to say, which explains Drury's conclu-
sion that his work is "fascinating." On the other hand, the interest-
ing things seem to be embedded in a fog of words that, I suspect, is 
not worth the effort to penetrate. For students of constitutional 
law, perhaps the message of Straussian political theory is that they 
should read their texts very closely, paying particular attention to 
the genre and intended audience of the texts. Those of us who have 
spent a month or more of class time on Marbury v. Madison (or, in 
my classes, on The Federalist Papers) are unlikely to regard this as 
hot news. 
MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAW. By Michael Perry.1 
New York: Oxford University Press. 1988. Pp. 323. $29.95. 
Michael Zucker! 2 
If Professor Michael Perry did not exist, we would be tempted 
to invent him-as a paradigm of lawless jurisprudence. Professor 
Perry's first book, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights, 
was apparently designed to liberate constitutional analysis from 
I. Professor of Law, Northwestern University. 
2. Professor of Political Science. Carleton College. 
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law. His new book has something of the character of Rocky II or 
Nightmare on Elm Street 12-it's an obvious sequel and replay of a 
popular work. 
Perry clearly means to remedy some deficiencies of that earlier 
book. The two chief additions are a substantive discussion of the 
nature of morality and moral theory, and a "hermeneutical" discus-
sion of legal interpretation. As a foundation for discussing these 
additions, I will first recapitulate the main points of Perry's first 
book. 
I 
The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights was an elo-
quent defense of non-interpretivist judicial review (N.I.R.). For 
those who have been out of the solar system for the past decade or 
so, I should explain that N.I.R. occurs "when [the Court] makes 
the determination of constitutionality by reference to a value judg-
ment other than one constitutionalized by the framers." The legiti-
macy of N.I.R. is in question because "in our political culture, the 
principle of electorally accountable policy making is axiomatic." 
When the Court engages in Interpretive Review, by contrast, it does 
not pose the same question of legitimacy, for the Constitution itself 
has been adopted through democratic procedures, and widespread 
consensus exists in American society as to the propriety of the 
Court's making decisions on the basis of "value judgments constitu-
tionalized by the framers." 
Perry argued that most of the important constitutional deci-
sions of the past three decades or so (since Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation) had been instances of N.I.R. It follows, he claimed, that 
either most of what the Court has done in the modern era is grossly 
illegitimate or that there is some justification for the Court's exer-
cise of this extraordinary power. 
To solve this problem, Perry developed a "functional justifica-
tion" of N.I.R. Such a justification proceeds by identifying "an im-
portant, even indispensable, function" the practice serves. 
American political life has a "self-understanding" which Perry 
called "religious," meaning merely that Americans believe, in the 
words of Robert Bellah, that "the will of the people is not the crite-
rion of right and wrong. There is a higher criterion in terms of 
which this will can be judged; it is possible that the people may be 
wrong." Or, as Bellah restated it: "Morality is not arbitrary ... 
Justice cannot be reduced to the sum of the preferences of the 
collectivity." 
This American commitment to non-arbitrary morality, more-
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over, "has generally involved a commitment-though not necessar-
ily a fully conscious commitment-to the notion of moral 
evolution." The "important function" to be played by the Court 
comes to light at this point: it is necessary for a society with such a 
commitment to moral evolution or growth to have an agency which 
can sponsor or foster that growth. In selecting that agency, we 
should bear in mind that although the commitment to growth is 
part of the moral self-consciousness (more or less) of American so-
ciety, any given instance of growth is perforce a matter of changing 
the regnant morality and therefore a matter of going beyond or even 
against the regnant morality. Those who call society into the moral 
beyond play a prophetic role, as the Biblical prophets did for the 
Hebrew people. The more democratic political agencies, precisely 
because they are accountable to the people, are kept loyal to the 
regnant morality to such a degree that they cannot be expected to 
play this prophetic role. From this perspective, the Court's non-
democratic character is an advantage: the Justices, unlike the poli-
ticians, can serve as our prophets. Not being accountable to those 
who adhere to "conventional morality," the Court is free to speak 
for the evolving moral consciousness of society. Thus, "non-inter-
pretive review in human rights cases enables us to take seriously-
indeed is a way of taking seriously-the possibility that there are 
right answers to political-moral problems." 
That formula captures very nicely the chief premises of Perry's 
thesis, and also points to its chief vulnerabilities-weaknesses that 
he has attempted to remedy in his new book. There are three such 
premises: (1) "There are right answers to moral-political pro-
blems"; (2) those answers should be translated into law; and 
(3) courts are entirely suitable agents for doing so. 
Despite its centrality to his argument, Perry handled his first 
premise in a notably unsatisfactory manner. He was, in the first 
place, most unclear as to whether he meant to ground his premise 
on a truth about morality or merely on American views about mo-
rality. He noted, for example, that "as a society we seem to be open 
to the possibility that there are right answers to political-moral 
problems," and at times he seemed to build his N. I. R. on that socie-
tal openness alone. But that foundation is problematic on several 
counts. What evidence is there that such a societal commitment 
actually exists? Perry presented none (apart from a quotation or 
two from Robert Bellah's controversial work on civil religion in 
America), and conceded that such evidence may not exist, and isn't 
decisive in any case: "But even if evidence were slight that we are 
open to that possibility, we should be open to it." That, of course, is 
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an entirely different claim, and must be defended on different 
grounds. 
Perry's shift from "is" to "should" reflects two further pro-
blems with his appeal to moral consensus. Even if there is such a 
consensus, it does not clearly follow that one can appeal from that 
consensus to positions beyond or contrary to it. If the authority is 
moral conventionalism, it becomes deeply problematic to use some 
parts of the conventional morality against other parts, for as con-
vention all parts are of equal authority. Remaining merely within 
conventions, Perry cannot find the fulcrum to move the conventions 
as he wishes to do. 
The justification of N.I.R. as he developed it seems to depend 
in fact on the proposition that there really are right answers to polit-
ical-moral problems. That is evident from the position Perry identi-
fied as his strongest opposition, the Bork-Rehnquist jurisprudence, 
which tied the Court to Interpretivist Review precisely because 
"there are no right answers to the various political-moral questions 
presented to the Court in human rights cases-no right answers, 
that is, when no value judgment constitutionalized by the framers is 
determinative-and that any answer the Court gives, short of sim-
ply resolving ... the constitutional claim on interpretivist grounds, 
is ultimately nothing more than a matter of taste." An appeal to 
popular opinion does not even begin to invalidate the Bork-Rehn-
quist view of the proper judicial role, for that view rests on claims 
about the actual cognitive status of moral claims, and not on claims 
about what some people believe about the cognitive status of moral 
claims. That the Bork-Rehnquist view has difficulties of its own, 
some of which Perry exposed, does not invalidate the point that 
Perry's conventionalist appeal to (a possibly non-existent) moral 
consensus is insufficient. 
Perry conceded the inadequacy of the conventionalist appeal 
when he reformulated his claim in terms not of consensus but rather 
as the moral claim that "we should be open to ... the possibility 
that there are right answers to political-moral problems." That 
moral claim, presumably meant as a true claim, makes sense only if 
one can affirm that there may really be right answers. On that criti-
cal issue all he said was, "I shall not defend the proposition that we 
should take seriously the possibility that there are right answers: 
this is not a meta-ethical treatise. . . . I want merely to emphasize 
that the proposition, zf sound, is altogether adequate for the pur-
poses of the functional justification I develop." Yes, perhaps so. 
But then if the proposition "the President is divinely inspired" is 
sound, then that is "altogether adequate for purposes" of proving 
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that he ought to be vested with dictatorial powers. The soundness 
of the proposition asserted is precisely what is at issue. Sliding back 
and forth between a conventionalist claim which was inconclusive, 
and a realist claim which was unsupported, Perry ended up merely 
asserting that moral questions are as he wishes them to be. 
Moreover, Perry's failure to analyze or discuss the political-
moral matters allowed him to overlook many important distinctions 
that would have to be made even if he were able to make out a case 
for his position on "right answers." His functional justification as-
sumes without any argument that the "prophetic function" is prop-
erly played by a political agency. But the very paradigm from 
which he drew undercuts that suggestion: the Hebrew prophets 
were not men of authority and power, but "voices in the wilder-
ness." That there are right answers, that these right answers may 
develop or deepen the regnant morality, does not imply that some 
group of rulers should be designated to discern and impose these 
moral answers on the community. The Hebraic pattern would seem 
a better model. If the new "right answers" are truly deepenings of 
the regnant morality, then they should be able to make their way 
without being imposed by prophet-judges. This may not happen as 
quickly as Perry would like, but even he conceded that the Supreme 
Court can cause moral regress as well as moral progress. The Court 
has contributed its share of regressive decisions: Dred Scott, many 
decisions shackling governmental efforts to protect people against 
massive economic dislocations, and the systematic gutting of the 
post-Civil War amendments are obvious examples. 
Perry maintained that courts are entirely suitable bodies to 
play the prophet-statesman role. Here the Nightmare on Elm Street 
character of his prescription becomes very evident. Perry's courts 
would no longer be courts of law; they would instead have that pro-
verbial "roving commission" to right all moral wrongs that they 
espy. Their standards for decisions would not be a corpus of rules 
more or less made by another group of authorities, validated and 
authorized over time through the power of precedent and the force 
of legal inertia, but the new moral insights they themselves arrived 
at, independently of and even against both the law and the regnant 
moral consensus. This is a nightmare vision, for sure, but there is a 
more prosaic problem as well: if courts derive their authority to 
make binding decisions from their connections to the law, what 
gives them authority when they no longer have any particular con-
nection to law? Merely the fact that they are not elected? Or the 
fact that during a particular period they are controlled by lawyer-
politician-prophets with whose political beliefs one agrees? 
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II 
Perry's new book implicitly seeks to remedy some of these 
grave deficiencies. Morality, Politics and Law attempts to defend 
Perry's assertion that there can be right answers to moral and polit-
ical questions, and to sketch the outlines of what such answers 
might look like. Perhaps sensing that that effort fails, Perry then 
proceeds to attempt to reconnect the Court to the law by represent-
ing the Court's role not as mere prophet-statesmanship, but as a 
form of interpretation of legal texts. Unfortunately, this effort also 
fails. 
Like the hero of Rocky II, Perry has a return match against his 
old foe: the interpretivist approach to the Constitution championed 
by the likes of Robert Bork and William Rehnquist. Perry rightly 
identifies their approach as resting on moral skepticism, on the be-
lief that no knowledge about moral goods is available: all moral 
judgments are mere "value judgments," or statements of preference. 
From that perspective, the political issue becomes: whose prefer-
ences are to rule? Perry rightly rejects this account of politics, and 
attempts to supply the grounds for an alternative view, authenti-
cally moral in character. That alternative view is developed mainly 
for the sake of grounding N.I.R., which he now dubs "non-
originalism." 
Perry's attack on moral skepticism is a worthy enterprise, but 
on the whole an unsuccessful one. He identifies the audience for his 
book not as philosophers, but as "lawyers and law students, judges 
and other public officials, and, in general, citizens." He writes as 
though he is aiming at a legal audience, offering a pastiche of claims 
made by various "authorities" in the field of ethics, strung together 
like an appellate brief. Lacking the sustained argumentation which 
distinguishes a work of philosophy, it has very much the ipse dixit 
character of some judicial opinions-laying out claims with very 
little discussion and even less concreteness in the discussions that do 
occur. This last is ironic, for one of his chief claims concerns the 
priority of the particular over the general in moral argument. 
Nonetheless, I can hardly recall a book or article on a moral topic 
so doggedly general, so abstractly vague, so little engaged with spe-
cific instances as this one. Moreover, Perry exhibits some of the 
least attractive qualities of current legal scholarship. As Richard 
Posner recently pointed out, law professors tend to be importers of 
thoughts from other disciplines. As such, they often lack mastery 
of their material. 
Perry's critique of John Rawls exemplifies this phenomenon. 
He takes issue with Rawls's effort to develop a theory of justice in 
452 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 6:431 
which a doctrine or conception of right is prior to a conception of 
good. One manifestation of this commitment in Rawls's theory is 
the famous "veil of ignorance" which requires, among other things, 
that the choice of principle of justice be made in ignorance of one's 
particular conception of the good. Rawls is very, very, very careful 
to insist that he does not believe real human beings lack a notion of 
the good life. The "bracketing" of particular notions of the good is 
a condition Rawls believes should be imposed on our reasoning as 
we think about rules of justice. His justifications for this bracketing 
may or may not be adequate-that js debatable-but Perry doesn't 
begin to touch the issue or show he understands Rawls at all when 
he says that Rawls "presupposes a problematical conception of the 
person: someone-or, better, some 'thing'-whose identity or self is 
prior to, rather than constituted by (even in part), her conception of 
the good, her moral convictions and commitments." But Rawls has 
repeatedly insisted, even in some passages quoted by Perry, that he 
does not "depend on philosophical claims ... about the essential 
nature and identity of persons." Wrongly supposing that Rawls's 
representative individual behind the veil of ignorance reflects 
Rawls's conception of the human self, Perry responds: "I reject 
that conception of the person and accept a conception according to 
which a person's convictions are partly self-constitutive." But noth-
ing in the content of Perry's "alternative" conception of the self 
runs counter to anything Rawls is committed to in his theory. In-
deed, I suspect that Rawls would agree with Perry that a person is 
"partly self-constituted" by his or her convictions. Perry's "cri-
tique," in other words, is quite beside Rawls's point. 
Perry's effort to rebut moral skepticism rests on a "naturalist 
conception" of human good. Following some recent ethical theo-
rists like John Finnis, Perry describes the naturalist conception as 
"knowledge of how to live so as to flourish, to achieve well-being." 
As Perry sees it, naturalism answers Hume's famed Is-Ought prob-
lem: "The aim of morality is not to prove the value of flourish-
ing. . . . The impossibility of justifying the value of flourishing does 
not render moral knowledge problematic or call into question the 
notion of moral 'knowledge.' Thus the is-ought 'problem,' the fact 
that an ought statement cannot be deduced from an is-statement-
turns out not to be a problem at all, at least not for naturalism. 
Naturalism begins with the foundational commitment to flourish-
ing." As such an "is," it is also the source of the "oughts" which 
morality contains. 
Now there is, of course, a long tradition of naturalist ethical 
thinking of the sort Perry sketches, which can be traced back to 
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Aristotle and finds a powerful contemporary statement in Finnis's 
Natural Law and Natural Rights. Perry's treatment of naturalism, 
however, is far too abstract. Although he is eager to overcome 
moral skepticism, he is just slightly less eager to avoid the snares of 
moral dogmatism or moral monism. Thus while he perceives an 
existential commitment to flourishing as the foundation of morals, 
he carefully avoids giving the idea of flourishing any determinate 
content: "Any naturalist moral theory must acknowledge human 
variety as well as human commonality. That one human being has 
an interest in some matter does not mean that other human be-
ings-any or all of them-have an interest in that matter too. 
Moreover, there are a great variety of ways in which interests-even 
interests common to all or virtually all members of the human spe-
cies-can be satisfied." For that, and perhaps for other reasons, 
Perry pulls way back from what would seem the most important 
task: "My aim here is not to present a naturalist moral theory, only 
to sketch a naturalist account of moral knowledge." Perry spends 
his time developing a tool which he assures us can do a very fine job 
at its intended task, but refuses to let us see the tool at work. 
Perry is confident, however, that he has done enough to rout 
the chief villains: "Given the naturalist conception of moral knowl-
edge, the morally skeptical claim that there is no moral knowledge 
no matter how 'moral knowledge' is conceived, is manifestly im-
plausible." Perry strikes me as overly optimistic here, for those 
skeptics might well (and rationally) fail to be persuaded. I can im-
agine the following dialogue: 
Prof Perry: Of course there is moral knowledge in the sense of 
at least some rationally acceptable beliefs about how particular 
human beings ought to live if they are to flourish-beliefs about 
what they should do or refrain from doing if they are to live lives as 
deeply satisfying as any of which they are capable. (MP.L. 12, cf. 
39) 
Moral Skeptic: That may be so, but I wonder whether you're 
not being a bit arbitrary in saying that "flourishing" is the founda-
tional commitment of all morality. I've noticed many views about 
morality which do not seem to be statements about means to indi-
vidual well-being. 
Prof Perry: Naturalist moral theory does not purport to be a 
theory of what people ordinarily mean when they use moral terms. 
Rather, a naturalist moral theory is a theory of how to live so as to 
flourish. (MP.L. 17) 
Moral Skeptic: But isn't that just the issue, old chap? Aren't 
you begging the question here? As I said, I've heard much "moral-
454 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 6:431 
ity talk" which does not seem to be related to individual well-being 
at all. In fact, very often moral claims are intended to set limits on 
an individual's seeking of his or her own benefit. Consider the 
moral virtue of justice for instance. I really do think you ought to 
read some David Hume, old boy. 
Prof Perry: It is an open question whether a sound naturalist 
moral theory must be altruistic: how, if at all, does a person's com-
mitment to her own flourishing support an imperative to the effect 
"You shall treat your neighbor lovingly, for he is like yourself." 
Perhaps this question brings us to the limits of any truly "secular" 
moral philosophy. Increasingly I doubt that any such philosophy 
can support an imperative to the effect that one should "treat one's 
neighbor lovingly." (M.P.L. 22) 
Moral Skeptic: Exactly my point. And really, you must par-
don me if I do not follow you into your religion. That is out of 
bounds for this discussion. Besides being arbitrary in identifying 
morality with the means of flourishing, I'm not sure I understand 
you very well when you speak of "deeply satisfying lives." Just 
what do you mean by this? 
Prof Perry: Well, I don't mean the satisfaction of mere prefer-
ences. (MP.L. 80-81) 
Moral Skeptic: So, what do you mean? 
Prof Perry: Well, I don't mean "happiness," or any mental 
state or experience. (M.P.L. 79-80) 
Moral Skeptic: So, what do you mean? 
Prof Perry: Well, uh, I mean that one is flourishing to the ex-
tent one's "interests" are satisfied, and not flourishing to the extent 
they are not satisfied. And interests should never be confused with 
mere wants. A person can be quite mistaken about her interests. 
(M.P.L. 19) 
Moral Skeptic: Well, what do you mean by "interest"? 
Prof Perry: Any human being who is committed to flourishing 
is necessarily committed to, and in that sense has "an interest" in, 
whatever is constitutive of her flourishing. (M.P.L. 14) 
Moral Skeptic: Well, what do you mean by flourishing? 
We are in what they call in the computer world a loop; let us 
withdraw while we can. My point in constructing the above dia-
logue is not to say that a naturalist perspective cannot possibly beat 
back the attack of the skeptic; only to stress that Perry has not suc-
ceeded in doing so. 
Apart from the question of whether Perry successfully meets 
skeptical arguments, the naturalist position he half develops com-
ports remarkably little with the broader project of which it forms a 
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part. Perry seeks to ground morality for the sake of supporting 
what he now calls non-originalist review, but the kind of moral rea-
soning he would have the Supreme Court engage in seems much 
more related to a problem he admits that his naturalism does not 
deal well with-the loving treatment of one's neighbor. 
This seems to be the reason we are promised a Rocky III at the 
end of the book: "Love and power. That is a subject-an even 
larger subject than the one I've addressed here-for another day. 
The inquiry I've begun in this book ... is merely prologue to that 
inquiry." As may be clear when we discuss Perry's new views on 
the judicial role, this other inquiry is the one more clearly related to 
the "aspirational" jurisprudence he advocates. 
III 
Perry's moral naturalism, although missing from his first book, 
is a logical extension of that book's thesis. Concerning the role of 
the Supreme Court, however, Perry now offers some ideas whose 
implications are apparently quite different from those of the earlier 
book. Readers of C. C.H.R. will be surprised to see him say things 
like: "in American political-legal culture it is axiomatic that the 
constitutional text is authoritative-indeed supremely authorita-
tive-in constitutional adjudication. . . . Similarly, in American 
political-legal culture, 'the law' is axiomatically authoritative in ad-
judication." (MP.L. 131-32) Those are axioms Perry seems to 
have discovered only since 1982. 
Perry now replaces the dichotomy between interpretivism and 
non-interpretivism with that between originalism and non-original-
ism. Originalism: "a judge in deciding whatever public policy re-
garding some matter is constitutionally valid, ought to rely only on 
(1) 'original' beliefs-that is, beliefs (norms) established as authori-
tative through the ratification process-and (2) 'supplemental' be-
liefs-that is, beliefs reliance on which is necessitated by reliance on 
original beliefs." (MP.L. 123) Non-originalism, by contrast, does 
not hold a judge to original beliefs. 
Perry's shift in terminology is mandated by his tacit rejection 
of non-interpretivism as out of line with the axiom establishing the 
authoritativeness of the law and the Constitution in adjudication. 
The new book would thus seem far more moderate. What has al-
lowed Perry to discover at last those axioms about adjudication and 
law is an even more fundamental discovery-HERMENEUTICS! 
He now presents his views on the proper role of the judiciary in 
terms of a theory of the nature of interpretation. The discovery of 
hermeneutics allows Perry to reach pretty much the same place as 
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he did in the first book, but on seemingly more moderate and pub-
licly palatable grounds. 
His theory of interpretation, like his theory of morals, is heav-
ily derivative from recent philosophic writings, but he gives his own 
twist, for better or worse, to the reigning ideas in the field. He dif-
fers from many writers touched by hermeneutical reflection in that 
he accepts the view that an originalist interpretation, or one close 
enough for practical purposes of judging, is in fact attainable. He 
even concedes that originalism has a powerful normative founda-
tion. Perry parts company with many constitutional scholars, then, 
in finding originalism both possible and (to some degree) desirable. 
He rejects originalism, however, on "comparative" grounds: 
non-originalism is better than originalism. In the first place, non-
originalism is just as lawful as originalism. Unlike non-interpretiv-
ism, it passes the threshold test of satisfying the axiom about law 
and adjudication, for it is a legitimate and genuine act of interpret-
ing, i.e., finding the meaning in, the text. Non-originalism counts as 
a mode of interpreting the legal text, for texts are "polysemic": they 
"have a meaning in addition to the original meaning." The addi-
tional or "excess meaning" develops over time, perhaps out of the 
original meaning, "as a progressive generalization of the original 
meaning." This developed meaning Perry calls "aspirational mean-
ing," for it "signifies fundamental aspirations of the American polit-
ical tradition." Because all interpretation is finding meaning by 
someone (meaning is never merely free-floating), the aspirational 
meaning states what the text has come to mean for us. It is there-
fore in every sense of the term a meaning or interpretation of the 
text. Therefore, as a matter of fidelity to the mandate contained in 
Perry's axiom, non-originalism is as valid as originalism. 
Moreover, non-originalism is preferable to originalism. Every 
living tradition lives precisely in its ability to develop and respond 
to the aspirational and not merely the literal commitments which 
constitute it. The Court should play a "principal role" in this 
evolving aspirationalism for the reasons advanced in C C H. R. -the 
courts' insulation from the people make them more likely to be 
open to aspirational meanings. The courts are "in an institutionally 
advantaged position to play a prophetic role." 
Perry's new defense of judicial prophetism seems to set certain 
limits, however, which were not present in the earlier version. 
Perry emphasizes now that "a judge should bring to bear, in consti-
tutional cases, only aspirations signified by the text." He grounds 
this duty directly in the oath the judge takes to support the Consti-
tution. In interpreting a constitutional clause, says Perry, the judge 
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can legitimately act either the originalist or the aspirational, non-
originalist part, but he must select one or the other. 
I suspect, however, that Perry has retreated far less than ap-
pears on the surface. The "fundamental aspirations" to which the 
non-originalist judge harkens are, Perry admits, "highly indetermi-
nate." At the extreme, the aspirational meaning is something like 
what Justice Brennan identified as "the ideals of human dignity," or 
what Perry speaks of as "justice." A non-originalist judge is to give 
determinate meaning to these broad ideals; and what guidance 
should a judge follow in doing so? "The judge should rely on her 
own beliefs as to what the aspiration requires." When we add all 
this up, I think we are very much back where we were in 
C. C.H.R.-different title, same nightmare. The very broad moral 
ideals Perry finds as the aspirational meaning of the constitutional 
text are no different in practice from the roving commission to do 
good that he tried to justify in his first book. 
There is something paradoxical in all this: beginning from the 
sole legitimacy of textual interpretation, Perry works himself to a 
position identical for practical purposes to one that recognizes no 
obligation to the text. That paradox arises because Perry misde-
scribes the nature of interpretation in his treatment of aspirational 
meamng. 
Perry's hermeneutical argument depends on his claim that the 
aspirational meaning, what the constitutional provision has come to 
mean to us, is a valid meaning of the text. At least two difficulties 
with Perry's view come to mind immediately. He can perhaps deal 
with the first: he speaks of "aspirations of the American political 
tradition," but supplies no criteria by which one may distinguish 
which aspirations belong to the "tradition" as such, and which be-
long to subgroups or individuals. I suspect that in practice the lat-
ter is the operational meaning of the former. 
More importantly, Perry treats meaning in a text as if it were a 
mere aggregation of separate, nugget-like, meaning-bearing entities 
in which some meaning-nugget or other might put on weight, so to 
speak, and become ever more meaningful, again as a separate little 
nugget, independent of the others. But texts don't mean like that. 
A genuinely hermeneutical understanding-in the primal sense of 
hermeneutical theory-recognizes the interdependencies of mean-
ing between whole and parts, and among parts: in a text there are 
no meaning-nuggets. Everything means what it means within its 
context, and its context is, at the least, the larger text of which it is a 
part. 
The parts or clauses of the Constitution are therefore not just 
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sentences floating free in Michael Perry's moral consciousness. 
They are parts of a larger document, and that document is a law. If 
it were not a law, the courts would have no claim to be involved in 
making decisions based upon it, as Marshall made clear in Marbury 
v. Madison. To be a law is to be something other than a moral 
aspiration as such. Legal theorists disagree about what precisely 
distinguishes laws from moral ideals, but we need not settle those 
disputes to recognize that there is a difference. An interpretation of 
a legal text, like Perry's, which dissolves the difference between law 
and moral aspiration is not a valid interpretation of that law. Just 
as John Marshall had recourse to the overall character of the text in 
order to interpret one clause when he said "we must remember it is 
a Constitution we are interpreting," so we must always recall in 
constitutional adjudication that it is a law we are interpreting. We 
cannot validly express the meaning of a part of a text if we interpret 
that part in such a way as no longer to belong to the kind of text of 
which it is a part. A statement in a contract and a statement in a 
novel must be understood each in its own way. 
Moreover, aspirations do not only grow out of the legal text-
as its future, so to speak; they exist from the outset as inspiration for 
the legal provisions contained in the text. From the very beginning, 
there is an "excess of meaning." Nonetheless, a law is not a mere 
expression of aspiration but a concrete embodiment of aspiration, or 
better, of a certain mix of aspirations. Perry says that aspirational 
meaning does not negate original meaning but rather includes it 
while going beyond it. But if original meaning includes not just the 
"value" in question but the boundaries to that "value," then aspira-
tional meaning does indeed counter original meaning. One might 
say, for instance, that the constitutional text aspires to a strong 
presidency, but that would not justify concluding that an indefi-
nitely stronger presidency would fulfill the aspirations of the Consti-
tution even better than the weaker presidency suggested by the 
language of the text. For that aspiration is bounded by others 
which set limits to it. 
All other considerations aside, doesn't Perry's obsessive con-
cern that courts play the prophetic role of making moral aspirations 
vital in American society suggest a tremendous despair over the 
ability of Americans to respond to their own moral aspirations in 
any other way? Does this despair reflect a fear that most Ameri-
cans do not understand their moral aspirations as Perry (along with 
other elite intellectuals) does? I suspect so, and this is the real sub-
text in both of Perry's books. But to yield to that despair is to give 
up on the noblest aspiration of the American tradition: self-govern-
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ment. That aspiration contains many difficult tensions, to be sure, 
and it exacts a price, but fidelity to the aspirations of the tradition 
means fidelity to those tensions, and willingness to pay that price. 
For all his talk about the American political tradition and its 
aspirations, Perry is remarkably untouched by contact with any of 
its wellsprings. In my opinion, he would do better to read a little 
less of contemporary philosophy (even here less can be more) and 
devote more time instead to the materials of the tradition. He 
might begin with The Federalist and read carefully what the authors 
have to say about republicanism and about the unacceptability of 
governance by "a will independent of society." He then might try 
Abraham Lincoln, who shared Perry's concern for the moral 
groundings and aspirations of the American polity, but who yet un-
derstood far better what these required for a "government of the 
people, by the people, and for the people." And finally, he might 
reread Alexander Bickel, whom he quotes from time to time, but 
always in a self-serving way. He might consider how Bickel came 
to write a book called The Morality of Consent. 
It is easy to sympathize with Perry's desire for a moral com-
munity, but even easier to be repelled by his desire to further the 
rule of willfulness over the rule of law. But willfulness, no matter 
how dressed up in the latest philosophic theories and the most high-
minded rhetoric remains-willfulness. 
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY. By Walter 
Berns.t New York: Simon & Schuster. 1987. Pp. 288. 
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Constitutions are things whose substance is language; and nat-
ural languages are alive with wormholes and pitfalls, so plastic in 
the hands of an interpreter that the true study of a political consti-
tution lies not in the intentions of those who drafted the text, but of 
those who have interpreted it. It is people, not words, that possess 
meaning. Such, at any rate, is the modern fashion, against which 
the old convention, the Constitution as a framework of constraints 
and fences and walls, stands in stark contrast. 
Professor Walter Berns seems entirely unaffected by the mod-
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